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Aid and development by design: local solutions to local problems
Adrian Flint and Christian Meyer zu Natrup
ABSTRACT
This article makes a case for a reconceptualisation of aid and development
programme design. Speciﬁcally, it questions the role of the international
“development expert” in the design and implementation process. We
argue that by employing “design thinking” as a guiding principle, the
way in which aid programmes are envisaged and delivered can be
radically overhauled, resulting in dramatically improved outcomes for
the users of aid. We argue that practical improvements in delivery are
achievable through locally rooted, “user-driven” development solutions
that originate from the beneﬁciaries themselves. Design thinking as
applied here goes signiﬁcantly further than other programme design
and implementation methodologies that champion locally owned,
needs-driven assistance. Furthermore, we make a case for this approach
addressing wider problems within the sector, namely the perception, in
some quarters, that aid is intrinsically “neo-imperialist” in design and
ideologically driven.
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Introduction
This article is about the role of experts in development and redeﬁning how we think about helping
strangers. In particular, we make a case for trusting people to help themselves.
There is currently a great deal of cynicism about the role of experts among the general public in
donor countries, epitomised by U.K. minister Michael Goves’ infamous retort that “people in this
country have had enough of experts”. While this article in no way endorses such a view, we do question
the degree to which development has become such an expert-led sector. Speciﬁcally, we question
the way in which expert-designed programmes crowd out the voices of those who understand
the challenges best; the users of aid. Here we deﬁne “users of aid” as individuals, organisations,
groups, and governments who are aﬀected by taxpayer and donor-funded aid and development pro-
grammes, typically in developing and transitioning countries. The term, therefore, covers many
potential actors within the “donor/recipient” framework that governs North–South relations. What
they have in common, despite diﬀerences in terms of power and levels of engagement, is their pos-
ition with respect to donor-driven notions of development and how these might be achieved.
We argue, instead, that experts and expertise are important to the process of development but not
in the manner that the present model is currently conceived. We make a case for a form of beneﬁ-
ciary-led aid (Flint and Meyer zu Natrup 2014) facilitated and supported by experts, but not deﬁned
by them. In particular, we position ourselves at odds with the “expert as saviour” approach in which
technocrat international development consultants, occasionally but not always relevant country
experts, are parachuted into communities to address local development issues. Rather, we outline
a model of development based on “design thinking” – one focused on the users of aid as co-creators
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of all relevant programme details; a model that involves a transfer of power from the funders of aid to
the users of aid. We argue that this approach, while redeﬁning how aid is practised, is nonetheless
actionable within current parameters. At its core, it demands a change in mindset, redeﬁning what
“development expertise” entails and how aid is delivered. We argue that the approach brings numer-
ous beneﬁts – to donors and users alike – with respect to value for money, and, more importantly,
eﬀectiveness and sustainability.
The article is set out as follows: we outline weaknesses within current aid delivery models, detail
how a model incorporating design thinking might address the challenges raised, oﬀer a view of how
the approach might operate in the “real world”, and assess the implications of such an approach to
the sector as a whole.
A broken model
“Aid doesn’t work” is a refrain we hear regularly in parts of the media in countries like the U.K. “Why is
YOUR cash given to foreign dictators” asks the Daily Express. “Misplaced charity” argues the Economist,
“U.K. aid money: generosity or wasted spending?” asks the B.B.C., “New report conﬁrms that aid
money is wasted (we told you so)” crows a TaxPayers’ Alliance media release. An Ipsos MORI poll
in 2012, which surveyed opinions across 24 countries, found that a majority of respondents (51%)
believed that their country’s aid spending was wasted. The 2018 Oxfam scandal has done little to
improve this public trust. This is not to say that people don’t believe that aid is important, but that
there is increasing scepticism with respect to how it is spent. Even the most ardent supporters of
aid spending would be prepared to admit that funds could be better targeted and better spent.
The literature surrounding aid is vast, and academic debates on aid have raged for over half a
century (Rostow 1960; Frank 1971; Baran 1973; Wallerstein 1974; World Bank 1990). More recently,
in the wake of movements like “Make Poverty History”, themselves inspired in part by the U.N. Mil-
lennium Development Goals (MDGs), a “great aid debate” has arisen, pitting opposing ideological
perspectives against each other and aﬀording their proponents a certain degree of celebrity
status. The two “stars” of this debate over aid have unquestionably been Dambisa Moyo (who
came to prominence with her bestselling book Dead Aid) and her “opponent” Jeﬀrey Sachs
(whose book The End of Poverty has become a core text on many university reading lists). While
not necessarily household names, both have developed high media proﬁles. Moyo (2010) represents
a “radical” school of thought on aid, heavily shaped by neo-liberal logic, demanding an end to aid (the
argument put forward is that aid exacerbates poverty). This school of thought also includes analysts
like William Easterly (2006) and Robert Calderisi (2006). Unlike Moyo, Calderisi (2006) does not
demand an end to aid, but a halving of funding on the basis the smaller budgets are easier to
manage and there is less scope for corruption and mismanagement. On the other side are the pro-
ponents of aid, led by Sachs (2005), who argue that while there are issues with respect to implemen-
tation, aid can oﬀer a way out of poverty – high proﬁle allies include Giles Bolton (2007), Paul Collier
(2007), Jonathan Glennie (2008), and Amartya Sen (1999). Leftwing critiques, more in the tradition of
Marxist/dependency (critical) theorists of the 1960s and 1970s, have also contributed to the debate,
albeit with less of a proﬁle – for example, Paulette Goudge (2003), Kothari and Minogue (2002), and
Yash Tandon (2009).
What unites them all, at the most basic level, is a view that aid does not always work in the way
that it is intended. Unfortunately, with respect to this nearly 15-year-old great debate, actionable sol-
utions for the sector as a whole remain thin on the ground. Drawing on our disciplines of academia
(Flint) and aid worker (Meyer zu Natrup) respectively, we propose a “simple” solution – that all aid and
development programmes “on the ground” need to start with the direct involvement with those
aﬀected.1 We posit that current models of “consultation” and “participation” are largely box-ticking
exercises, with little meaningful impact on how aid is delivered (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Mohan
2001; Flint and Meyer zu Natrup 2014). Given the lack of meaningful input from aﬀected commu-
nities, it is little surprise that aid projects and programmes fail. They fail because they are poorly
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designed, with little genuine understanding of the end user. While this point is generally acknowl-
edged, little has been done over the past decades to actively change how aid is delivered.
Instead, what we observe is a continuous tweaking of the model, to little eﬀect. Without direct
input, from the beginning, by the users of aid, little of substance can be achieved.
Accordingly, we do not argue against aid but rather the way in which it is practised. This in itself is
not particularly novel (or novel at all). Unlike critical theorists (Kothari and Minogue 2002; Goudge
2003; Tandon 2009), we don’t look to the structural level, but look instead to how aid programmes
are conceived and operationalised. We ﬁnd, quite simply, that as aid and development programmes
are not designed for speciﬁc intended users, they cannot work. Innovations like needs assessments
toolkits have seen improvements, but have not solved the problem of poor programme outcomes.2
The key problem with such tweaks is that aid and development design, even with the best needs
assessments (which are rarely done), is formulaic in nature. In order to work, experts need to be enga-
ging with users, not focused on established questionnaire and focus group templates.
As set out in Figure 1, a typical design cycle for any aid or development programme consists of ﬁve
main stages. While some donors and implementers might seek to extend the needs assessment
period and insert inception phases during the implementation phase, the timeframe in which the
aid-aﬀected community can be engaged is limited. This model, driven by a results-based manage-
ment methodology and focused mainly on demonstrating value for money, does not allow for a
truly collaborative co-creation process. Using private sector language is helpful here in making the
point that, in short, the aid “product” is developed and tested without ever really asking the “consu-
mers” what they require.
A key failing in many critical (leftwing) approaches to the question of aid is that while the critiques
have merit and, in many respects, the injustices of the global economic order are unquestionably part
of the development conundrum, such approaches rarely oﬀer “actionable” solutions short of
Figure 1. A traditional project management cycle. Source: Flint and Meyer zu Natrup (2018).
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overwhelming (and revolutionary) structural change. While our approach can be viewed as “problem
solving”, we situate ourselves some way from both the Sachs and Moyo schools. We propose an
opportunity for radical change but within the current system and framework; change capable of deli-
vering a range of achievable gains while not denying the need for greater justice within the global
political economy more generally. Importantly, we focus on the process inherent in developing such
programmes rather than the end result. At present, aid programmes are result rather than process
orientated, leading to less than optimal outcomes. What we propose instead is a model that
focuses on the process of aid delivery and development programme design, trusting the participants
to arrive at their own desired goals. It is important to stress that we are talking about the goals of
those at whom the aid and development funds are directed, here deﬁned as aid users. Under this
scenario, the aid sector, largely headquartered in the Global North, will serve as an “eco-system”
for providing funding, technical assistance, research capacity, and project delivery infrastructure. It
does not, however, set the aims of what is to be done. This represents a fundamental change with
respect to agendas pertaining to goal-setting on the part of donors, who are asked to (partially)
fund programmes while giving up a signiﬁcant degree of control.3 The model presupposes
moving away from any target-driven governing frameworks even, for example, the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) – trust needs to be at the core of the process, there cannot be caveats
if genuine empowerment is to take place. In this sense, the model proposed can be described, for
want of a better phrase, as “radical reformist”. Our reformist approach radically expands the engage-
ment of aid users beyond extractive needs assessments (essentially sites for data mining) towards
meaningful co-creation. With this in mind, we envision a user-driven process of programme
design based on multiple iterations and rapid “prototype” testing, resulting in bespoke programmes
(not programmes derived from templates).
A design thinking model of development
It is uncontroversial to state that, while advances in user consultation and needs assessment have
been made, donor programmes remain top-down expert-led aﬀairs. As Figure 1 sets out, the basic
model, familiar to all in the sector, from major international ﬁnancial institutions like the World
Bank, bilateral agencies like USAID and DFID, private charitable bodies like the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation, and NGOs, runs along predictable lines. Operationally, the beneﬁts of this
problem-solving approach, derived and adapted to some extent from expert-dependent ﬁelds like
engineering and management (e.g. product development science, lean management, and total
quality management techniques), are that donors can subscribe to a “rational”, “evidence-driven”
and “goal-orientated” approach that has clearly deﬁned procedures and parameters. Over the last
20 years, in order to make the process more “human”, earnest endeavours to make global develop-
ment and aid eﬀorts more participatory have been introduced. However, even in the best examples,
development experts have succeeded only in making the programmes slightly more participatory. In
eﬀect, the underlying ownership of the work remains with the donor, imposing its vision (however
benignly intended) on the poor. The current model relegates the users of aid to the sidelines; they
are “programme takers”, not “programme makers”, regardless of levels of consultation and partici-
pation. The model we propose addresses this underlying problem of ownership that results in so
many aid and development programmes failing.
There are numerous problems with the model in Figure 1 that any development practitioner will
be familiar with (see, e.g., “insider” accounts like Mosse 2005; Bolton 2007). Based on our personal
experience in the ﬁeld, we focus speciﬁcally on the following key problems: the experts brought
in to design the programme frequently have insuﬃciently nuanced local knowledge, they are not
embedded; needs assessments are conducted with little real input from aﬀected communities (gen-
erally used for data mining); solutions are modelled in accordance with established practices and
often ideologically – and politically – informed; programmes are implemented by outsiders
brought in on short-term contracts; and programmes are evaluated in accordance to narrowly
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deﬁned criteria. Furthermore, programme goals are often aspirational, rather than addressing more
modest, but realistic targets. Crucially, it is diﬃcult to factor empathy into the model. We maintain
that in order to really understand a set of development or aid problems, empathy is vital.
Empathy is not merely a feeling of sympathy, but a genuine experience of the problems, the
context in which they exist, the people and organisations aﬀected and the reality in which the aid
and development challenge sits. Empathy requires deep emersion and embedding into the
context, beyond that of expert-led political economy analysis or needs assessments.
The process described above is linear in progression and oﬀers little scope for learning and iter-
ation. The linearity stems directly from established donor funding models, which require having to
move from programme design, to implementation, to evaluation in distinct phases. Accordingly,
as a general rule, a programme is designed, implemented, and audited and, after three to four
years, written up as being completed. We propose a more reﬂexive and organic model based on
design thinking and abductive reasoning, one that is user driven. Design thinking, as practised in
sectors like IT and management consulting, oﬀers a useful starting point. The term “design thinking”
was coined by Peter Rowe (1986), although the process as we currently understand it was pioneered
by organisations like IDEO in the early 1990s. Proponents have argued that linear ways of thinking –
deductive and inductive – prevent imaginative/innovative solutions to problems. Design thinking
oﬀers the introduction of “intuition” into the thinking process, achieved by embracing uncertainty
and even chaos, with only a vague sense of the end product (Brown 2009). Although the term has
become something of a buzzword within business (and often stripped of most of its meaning),
this methodology might oﬀer a radical solution to the problems that have beset development and
aid programmes over the past few decades.
Within design thinking, the solution is not known at the start (the project has a “fuzzy front
end”). Neither is the process intended to deliver the “product”. It involves, instead, an acceptance
by the designer that they might not have suﬃcient knowledge to complete their project on their
own. Within design thinking in the IT sector, for example, in application or software development
the user is engaged from the start and is a co-creator in the process. The ﬁrst priority for appli-
cation developers is determining what the user wants and how the user will engage with the
product. The IT expert’s role is to “reverse engineer” a solution based on user needs and require-
ments. This involves the expert embedding themselves with the users, observing and questioning
(keeping an open mind and not making judgments). Furthermore, it involves rapid prototyping
with a view to testing (on the expectation that the majority of early versions will fail or be
inadequate). The process is built on a feedback loop, involving numerous iterations of the
design. It also involves “learning by doing”. In this sense, initial failure is integral to the process.
The bulk of the process is focused on ideation and testing. The process is reﬂexive, not linear –
as outlined in Figure 2.
Steps 1 and 2 bring the designer and end users together. It is easy to assume that “problem
identiﬁcation” is obvious whereas, in reality, without eﬀectively identifying the problem, the search
for a solution becomes meaningless. Step 3 takes the “solution” away from the designer and
places it in the hands of the intended end users who then collaborate to ﬁnd solutions. In step 4,
the designer, in consultation with the end users, produces prototypes which can then be tested
(with the expectation that many will fail before a workable solution is arrived at). In step 5, the
ﬁnished product is handed over to the end users who are then free to embark on a process of con-
tinual reﬁnement by re-engaging with the process when necessary, thereby creating an ongoing
feedback loop. As stated, this is a reﬂexive and dynamic process, involving multiple reptitions and
iterations, with any of the ﬁve steps potentially being repeated numerous times. The point to empha-
sise is that it is only through this seemingly “messy” abductive process that a tailor-made “product”
can be achieved. By deﬁnition, in terms of scale and reachability, the process will need to start with a
fairly deﬁned group of end users, at least to begin with.
At the heart of the process is trust that the users understand the “problem” and know what they
want or need. The beneﬁts of the model in IT, and other sectors are incontrovertible, and have
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enabled the development of some iconic products – applications like PayPal, Spotify and products
like the Smart car being just a few examples. Apple, Google, Accenture are examples of companies
that have placed a signiﬁcant degree of emphasis on design thinking. The conceptual leap in trans-
ferring work practices from the IT and management consulting sectors to the development and aid
sector might seem something of a stretch and potentially controversial but, we contend, lessons can
be learnt.
Within the development and aid sector, the “customer” is largely excluded from the design
process, despite the fact that they will be the “end users”. Although there have been developments
with respect to actual product design for people facing speciﬁc challenges in developing countries (a
“human design thinking approach”), this approach has not been expanded to embrace development
and aid programmes at a sectoral level.4
So how to engage the “customer”? Aid experts are usually parachuted in – they often have little
knowledge of conditions on the ground (even if the experts are country specialists, no expert can
claim expertise on every area and sector within that given territory and few experts would have
the time to deeply immerse themselves and develop real empathy). Yet local knowledge is crucial
to the success of any project. This is hardly a revelation and programmes are now designed with a
heavy emphasis on consultation and participation. However, such consultation is, by deﬁnition,
“quick and dirty” and, given ﬁnancial and time constraints, can never hope to capture local con-
ditions. A design thinking approach would address this fundamental issue from the outset – aid
users would be asked to identify key problems and help identify solutions themselves. The
expert’s job would be to facilitate proposed solutions.
A key area to be addressed before proceeding is the use of language and the jargon in which
design thinking is framed. To reduce development to a consumerist interaction between “end
users” and “service providers” is not what is intended. We are not proposing a business model as
a way forward but rather a “thinking model”. This model is predicated on aid beneﬁciaries being
the shapers and drivers of the development process from the outset. It is a methodology that is pro-
foundly democratising and built on genuine respect and co-ownership. It oﬀers the basis for a system
1.Problem 
idenﬁcaon
2. Problem 
deﬁned by those 
aﬀected
3. Soluons 
brainstormed by 
those aﬀected
4. Soluon 
prototype 
development 
(potenally 
mulple 
iteraons)
5. Handover of 
soluon and 
evaluaon
Figure 2. A design thinking project cycle. Source: Flint and Meyer zu Natrup (2018).
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of development provision which puts beneﬁciaries at the centre of the decision-making process. It is,
in eﬀect, the operationalisation of what can be viewed as beneﬁciary-led aid (Flint and Meyer zu
Natrup 2014).
What a design thinking model of aid might look like in practice
The design thinking-inspired model is actionable and appropriate to “real world” engagement (rather
than an idealised wish list of proposals). According, we oﬀer an overview, based on personal pro-
fessional engagement with projects similar to that outlined below, of how the model might be action-
able. For reasons of conﬁdentiality and to prevent conﬂict of interest, no speciﬁc programmes are
identiﬁed. Instead, the example we set out represents, based on our experience, a fairly typical com-
posite of projects that will be familiar to anyone who has worked on, or observed, aid donors and
contractors in action.
Our composite “problem” considers the issue of local government capacity in a developing
country. In this example, the local authority is poorly staﬀed and resourced, and is struggling to
provide eﬃcient and accountable public services to its population. Standard processes like the issu-
ance of business licences takes too long, and applicants are often successful only when bribing
oﬃcials (who can revoke licences at will). Such actions hurt the local business community and
make it impossible to create suﬃcient local growth and employment. Traditional needs assessments
have identiﬁed the underlying issues as being economic underdevelopment, socially and culturally as
sanctioned corruption, a shortage of skills within the local authority, and less than eﬃcient adminis-
trative systems and processes.
This represents a fairly standard problem of service delivery by local authorities in any number of
developing countries. Based on the commissioned needs assessments and participatory exercises
with the local authority, the donor designs terms of reference for a four-year capacity building and
anti-corruption programme. A key focus for the donor is to involve civic service organisations in
order to hold the government to account. In addition, the donor publishes a tender for the work
systems and processes to be analysed and improved. The remaining aspects of the programme
are then also put out to tender, a process that can frequently last more than six months.
Typically, during the inception phase, contractors report low motivation and ownership on the
part of local authority oﬃcials, with a demonstrably notable reluctance to attend training sessions
or cooperate in the systems review. In addition, contracted NGOs working on anti-corruption projects
report threats against staﬀmembers, diﬃculties in obtaining visas, and other work impediments. The
result is that while all of the associated projects are managed by highly trained and professional
development contractors – and some successes are often achieved – the projects fall behind sche-
dule and the possible impact of the funding is diminished. However, in keeping with the established
model, “success” is usually deﬁned in terms of milestones rather than hard to quantify (especially in
the short term) achievements, such as training sessions completed, system reports written and anti-
corruption advocacy conducted. In essence, the programme is assessed as being “successful”, despite
having subsequently been found (in the long term) to have little eﬀect.
In terms of design, this is a system that is donor directed, expert devised, and expert implemented.
Proponents of the model might argue that the percentage of national staﬀ at implementing organ-
isations has steadily increased over the past few years, but this does not detract from the fact that the
aid users are rarely, if at all, meaningfully consulted. Reﬂecting the process illustrated in Figure 1, “the
problem” is identiﬁed and analysed by experts, a solution devised (usually with a degree of partici-
patory input), and a plan then executed. Needs assessments, generally the basis for “on the ground”
data, are methodologically limited and only oﬀer very partial insights into the needs and wants of
intended end users. In short, the experts generating “the solution” never form a clear picture of
the aﬀected community; it is simply not possible. They are far away from experiencing real
empathy for the people concerned, the context and the problem. Nonetheless, “the solution”,
once devised and signed-oﬀ, then becomes a programme blueprint, with little room for reﬂexivity,
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learning or iteration over the next three to four years. An unintended consequence of the rigid pro-
gramme design is an inability for involved experts to incorporate lessons learnt, and indeed to learn
any lessons in the ﬁrst place. The system actively, if unintentionally, discourages reﬂexivity. Although
the solution identiﬁed by the donor and its contractors is usually participatory in some form, local
voices are not part of devising it. Throughout the work, the donor and its contractors remain directive.
A design thinking approach would reconceptualise the programme outlined above diﬀerently,
speciﬁcally with respect to addressing the role of expert inputs.
Figure 3 shows our proposed design thinking methodology. This would not appear new to
many in the IT, management consulting, and some engineering disciplines, but its application to
the development and aid sector would represent something of a paradigm shift. Rather than iden-
tifying a particular problem “from above”, the “discovery stage” focuses on extensive community
engagement – the focus is to identify a set of aid and development challenges like an anthropol-
ogist might, a more observational approach, in dialogue with the local community and over an
extended period of time. The aim of the “discover” and “description” phases is to ﬁnd and
agree an accurate description of a set of problems, ambitions and wishes as well as to build
true rapport and trust with the future aid users. This takes time. Community identiﬁed responses
are then tested through a process of joint idea ﬁnding and rapid “prototyping”, resulting in an
ever-intensifying test environment. This is repeated a number of times. “Failure” is an integral
part of the process and involves testing by “doing”. This in turn generates knowledge and experi-
ence, as well as builds trusts. The role of the international development expert is to facilitate the
community’s ownership of the project and to provide funding in order to action the bespoke pro-
totypes. The ability of the implementing organisations to rapidly scale up and develop programme
prototypes is, therefore, more important than their established credentials on running develop-
ment and aid programmes.
It is important to stress that the expert is there to assist in making the community’s plans work, not
to devise the programme itself. The expert merely facilitates the process and provides a platform for
all stakeholders to input that which is not automatically rooted in the local power structures. The
emerging ideas are then expert developed and tested. Failure is not only acceptable but viewed
as part of the learning process. Consequently, any solutions identiﬁed would be shaped by local
Figure 3. Phase 1 of a design thinking process. Source: Flint and Meyer zu Natrup (2018).
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knowledge and expertise, ensuring a far greater degree of programme sustainability – this in turn
would allow donors to exit the programme far earlier in the process than would have been the
case in the traditional programme design methodology. Phase 2 of the programme’s development
is illustrated in Figure 4 of the programme development process.
Having developed several prototypes and allowed them to fail at various stages in the programme
development process, promising solutions to the development or aid challenge are then tested.
Testing is diﬀerent from prototyping in several key aspects: (1) tests are done under as scientiﬁc con-
ditions as possible (e.g. control groups, random testing, etc.); and (2) considerably larger sample sizes
are used than in the prototyping. Failure or limited success of the solution is still very possible. The
community, with facilitation from the expert and/or implementing organisation, will then have to
decide carefully how long to test a possible solution before declaring it a failure or success. The temp-
tation to declare success at an early stage must be resisted. When the community is satisﬁed with the
test, only then will the solution be implemented (this will require patience on the part of donors,
accepting that the process cannot be rushed). This last stage is not very diﬀerent to current forms
of implementing development and aid projects, except that the extensive prototyping and testing
of the solution will provide a much better basis for impact assessment as comparative values and
data of previous, non-executed solutions will be available for comparison. Design thinking evolved
development and aid solutions will have, therefore, the signiﬁcant advantage that the “holy grail”
for development and aid practitioners is more likely to be achieved: solid impact data.
In practice, a design thinking approach to the “case study” outlined above would look something
like the following: the expert would observe how services were delivered by the local authority by
embedding themselves in the local community for an extended period. A similar process would
occur within the local authority. The community would be asked to identify key failings in delivery
and highlight their concerns and frustrations. These data would then be relayed to the local authority.
The expert would sit down with local authority personnel and solicit their responses. Personnel would
be asked how to best respond to the problems raised and how they might be best addressed. These
discussions would then be brought together as speciﬁc policy initiatives that would be rolled out in
quick succession (as pilots). What makes this process diﬀerent to extractive needs assessment or tra-
ditional community engagements is the fact that the pilots will represent the solutions the authorities
and the community have agreed together. This approach brings both key stakeholders together,
invests them in the success and holds them to account. The community, after an implementation
period, would be asked to reﬂect on these pilots, changing their design to address unforeseen pro-
blems (the model is not changed for them, but by them) they might have encountered. Local policy-
makers would then reﬁne or discard initiatives, dependent on their success and workability. This rapid
Figure 4. Phase 2 of a design thinking process. Source: Flint and Meyer zu Natrup (2018).
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prototyping approach would be continued until a sustainable solution was achieved. Importantly, the
role of the expert is one of facilitation, not direction. In this scenario, there is no ideal state or prede-
termined end goal (the programme has a “fuzzy front end”). The “leap of faith” is in trusting local
people to ﬁnd local solutions (to borrow from Ayittey). At a stroke, accusations of neo-imperialism
and Western-centric agendas are removed, as are problems of “ownership” and sustainability.
Various design elements can further support ownership and sustainability, through a focus on
joint funding initiatives, improved consultation, and improved donor exit strategies. The model
does, however, present potential problems for donors, namely a loss of control and public percep-
tions of such an approach in donor countries. Speciﬁcally, there is the issue of trust, that the users
of aid can be trusted to make the “right” decisions when left in charge of the process. This might
be especially true if solutions do not “look right” when reported in the media. Public reaction to inno-
vations like cash transfers in sections of the U.K. media has been tinged with suspicion, “Queue here
for U.K.’s £1bn foreign aid cashpoint: Just when you thought it couldn’t get any worse… YOUR cash is
doled out in envelopes and on ATM cards loaded with money”, proclaimed the Daily Mail in January
2017, in response to a U.K.-funded project in Pakistan. The article argues that as “much as
£300million is being lavished on a scheme in Pakistan that has been dogged by claims of corruption”.
This headline outlines some of the potential challenges facing the aid and development sector
when innovation is attempted. Despite the “indignation” apparent in such stories, cash transfer pro-
grammes are one of the most successful type of programmes funded by DFID and other donors. What
makes cash transfers successful is the same principle that makes design thinking a potentially suc-
cessful development and aid management technique. The advantage of providing cash to aid
users is to provide them with choice, ﬂexibility, dignity, and acknowledging that those in need under-
stand their needs best.
There are additional beneﬁts to a design thinking approach for the development and aid sector
more generally. The approach oﬀers tangible advantages in how programmes are devised, executed
andmonitored. Importantly, over and above context-speciﬁc gains, the approach facilitates reﬂexivity
and creative (abductive) thinking, breaking out of the cookie-cutter mould that has dominated the
sector for so long. Furthermore, it addresses failures in knowledge transfer between development
and aid contractors. Initiatives funded by donors that have aimed to enhance the transfer of knowl-
edge between aid practitioners have mostly not proven sustainable and have generally petered out
once the funding period has ﬁnished. Design thinking development programmes, however, will auto-
matically be customised to local context, power structures and actors, these being the usual impedi-
ments to successful knowledge transfers. This leads to signiﬁcantly improved programming
targeting. Community-driven development, aid and peacebuilding projects frequently fail because
they are not understood, desired or supported by the community they are supposed to assist.
Local power structures, notwithstanding earnest analysis of the prevailing political economy, are
seldom understood and it is even rarer that they are monitored during the project period. By
placing project ownership in the hands of the aﬀected community, these issues are addressed.
Conclusion
The role of the expert and programme implementing organisations in directing and implementing
development and aid programmes requires rethinking. Until such a shift occurs, the problems that
have aﬀected the sector will remain unresolved and the “great aid debate” will continue to rage.
We have argued, instead, that by adopting a design thinking approach to such programmes, one
that places aid users at the heart of the design process, this debate might be resolved. While user
participation and community consultation processes have improved over recent decades, they
remain expert led. By reconceptualising aid as something that is driven by local knowledge and
expertise, with the development expert as facilitator, we contend that the issues that have beset
the sector can be overcome. As shown, this approach, while certainly radical, is perfectly actionable
with the current system. However, it does require that ideologically driven goals be put to one side
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and an acceptance – in a real rather than rhetorical sense – that “one size ﬁts all” approaches are
doomed to fail. In order for this to be achieved, aid users must be trusted to know and understand
the context in which they are operating, which represents a signiﬁcant degree of divergence from
how development and oﬀer aid are currently practised. If this leap can be made, a sector driven
by bespoke beneﬁciary-led aid programmes is possible. This, in turn, will provide donors with
value for money, proof of impact, and aid users programmes that actually address their needs.
Most importantly, it is more likely to deliver the help and support that millions need, in the form
they need it, while retaining their dignity to choose and become the leaders in their own
development.
Notes
1. The ‘simple’ solution relates to the spending of funds already agreed by donors, on the ground. We do not make
any claims to address all the challenges facing the sector; for example, we do not address commitments, levels of
funding, the eﬀects of geopolitics, or the desire to use of aid as tool for foreign policy.
2. A needs assessment is a tool designed to help experts ascertain the key concerns of a given group. Having ident-
iﬁed what these might be, the needs are ranked according to perceived importance. They are generally generated
through interviews and surveys of aﬀected individuals. However, much of their value is determined by constraints
on time, resources, and access.
3. Our programme design methodology favours co-ﬁnancing models.
4. Groups like IDEO work speciﬁcally to help design products for people living in poorer developing countries. IDEO
products include innovations like aﬀordable solar lanterns and lost-cost sensors for farmers to monitor moisture
in the soil. See www.ideo.org.
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